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Strickler v. Pruett'
Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420
(4th Cir. June 17, 1998)2
I. Facts
At approximately 6:45 p.m. on January 5, 1990, James Madison University
sophomore Leanne Whitlock was returning her boyfriend's car to him at the
Valley Mall in Harrisonburg.3 Anne Stolzfus would later testify that at around
6:00 P.M. that same day she and her daughter entered the Music Land store in
the Valley Mall. Stolzfus would claim that she saw a blond woman and two men,
one of whom was "revved up" and impatient. The man, whom she would
identify as Tommy David Strickler, was behaving in such a loud, rude, and
boisterous manner that she watched him with apprehension.4
Shortly thereafter, Stolzfus and her daughterwere stopped in the Valley Mall
parking lot when a car driven by a "beautiful," "well dressed," "happy," "singing,"
"bright eyed," and "rich college kid" drove past.' Stolzfus would later testify that
she got a good look at the driver and identified her as Whitlock. Stolzfus would
also testify that Whitlock had pulled in front of her and stopped for traffic when
the "revved up" man from the music store came out of the Valley Mall and
proceeded to bang on vehicles in front of Whitlock's car. He then turned to the
Mercury Whitlock was driving and pounded on the passenger side window.6
Whitlock leaned over as if to lock the door, but Strickler wrenched the door open
and jumped into the car, facing Whitlock.7 The second man and the blond
woman seen earlier in the Valley Mall tried to enter the car also.8 Whitlock accel-
erated and "laid on the horn."9 Strickler hit Whiflock repeatedly on her shoulder
1. On September 14, 1998, the Supreme Court of the United States granted a stay of
execution. Strickler v. Greene, 119 S. Ct. 27 (1998). On October 5, 1998, the Court granted
Strickler's petition for writ of certiorari limited to the following questions: (1) Whether the State
violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and its progeny; (2) If so, whether the State's non-
disdosure of exculpatory evidence and the State's representation that its open file contained all Brady
material establishes the requisite "cause" for failing to raise a Brady claim in state proceedings; and
(3) Whether petitioner was prejudiced by non-disclosure. Strickler v. Greene, 119 S.Ct. 40 (1998).
2. This is an unpublished opinion which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions Without
Reported Opinions" at 149 F.3d 1170 (4th Cir. 1998).
3. Strickler v. Murray, 452 S.E.2d at 649 (Va. 1995).
4. Strickler, 452 S.E.2d at 649.
5. Striclder v. Pruett, Nos. 97-29, 97-30, 1998 WL 340420, at *5 (4th Cir. June 17, 1998).





and head. When the car stopped, Strickler opened the passenger door, and the
other two got into the backseat.0 The second man, whom Stolzfus later identi-
fied as Ronald Henderson, handed his coat to Strickler who put it on the floor
and "fiddled with it [for] what seemed like a long time."" Stolzfus testified that
she then pulled parallel to Whitlock's car, got out, and walked over to the Mer-
cury." As she approached the vehicle, Henderson "laid over on the seat to hide
from" her. 3 Stolzfus then returned to her car, faced Whitlock, and asked her
three times "are you O.K?"' 4 Each time Whitlocl looked at Stolzfus and then
down to her right."5 Whitlock mouthed a word that Stolzfus did not understand.
She later claimed Whitlock had said "help."' 6 Stolzfus pulled away and told her
daughter to go inside the Valley Mall and get security. The daughter refused."
Whitlock drove past Stolzfus very slowly, "went up over the curb... so the car
really tilted," and "laid on the horn again.""'i Stolzfus told her daughter to write
the license number down on an index card. Stolzfus claimed she remembered the
plate, West Virginia NKA 243, with a trick, "No Kids Alone 243"' or "No Kids
After 2-43, ' '2' but for some reason did not report the incident to law enforce-
ment. She was approached by Detective Dan Claytor of the Harrisonburg Police
Department only after a JMU student whom she had told about the incident
informed law enforcement.22
Eight days later, police searched the cornfield into which two witnesses had
seen a car similar to Whitlock's turn.' Police found Henderson's wallet, Strick-
ler's hair, Whitlock's clothing, and Whitlock's body.24 On February 27, 1990,
Strickler was indicted by an Augusta County grand jury for the robbery and
abduction ofWhitlock.25 On April 23, 1990, Strickler was indicted by an Augusta












22. Strick.er, 1998 WL 340420, at *6 n.7.
23. Id at *2.
24. Investigators later discovered Strickler had taken Whitlock's driver's license, identification
card, bankcard, watch, and earrings. Investigators also located hairs matching Strickler's on
Whitlock's clothing. They also found that the shirt Strickler had worn on the day of the murder
contained human blood stains and semen stains consistent with Stickler's semen. Unidentified
semen was also taken from Whitlock's body. Id at *2-3.
25. Whitlock was abducted in Rockingham County and murdered in Augusta County. Strick-
ler was charged with grand larceny, robbery and abduction in Rockingham county, but the Rocking-
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County grand jury for capital murder.26
One day before trial, an article appeared in the Roanoke Times containing
an interview with an unidentified prosecution witness, whom the Fourth Circuit
found was "obviously Stolzfus," summarizing the circumstances of Whitlock's
abduction.' This summary "closely tracked" Stolzfus' eventual trial testimony.'
It also, however, revealed a fact about which she would not testify: that she had
contacted Whitlock's boyfriend and viewed photographs of Whitlock." Follow-
ing a jury trial in Augusta County Circuit Court, Strickler was convicted of all
three charges." Based upon findings of Strickler's future dangerousness and the
vileness of the murder, Strickler was sentenced to death.31
After being denied relief on direct appeal and in collateral proceedings,
Strickler filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.32 During
discovery, Strickler's new defense team subpoenaed Harrisonburg Detective
Danny Claytor, who had interviewed Stolzfus on approximately five occasions
prior to trial.3 Detective Claytor took notes during, and typed reports of, his
interviews with Stolzfus. 4 In addition, Claytor received letters and "summaries"
from Stolzfus.3 s These documents -referred to by the parties as the "Stolzfus
materials" and labeled exhibits one through eight in the District Court pro-
ceeding - were kept in Harrisonburg Police Department files.36 The Common-
wealth attorney, Ervin, claimed Claytor had sent him three of the eight Exhibits,
which he had placed in his "open file" freely accessible to the defense. He said
he never saw the other five exhibits, nor did he know they existed.37 Defense
counsel claimed never to have seen the documents either.38
ham charges were nolkprosequi as a result of the Augusta County indictment. Id at *3, *3 n.3, n. 4.




30. Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at *3.
31. Id
32. Because Strickler's petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed prior to the April 24,1996
enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996, Pub.L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, the Chapter 153 amendments of the AEDPA did not apply to Strickler's
case. Id at *1 n. 1.
33. Id at *7.
34. Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at *7.
35. Id
36. Id
37. Tom Campbell, Convicdion, Death Sentence Nullified In Abdaction, Death, Richmond Times-
Dispatch, October 16, 1997, at B3.
38. Lee Ervin, the Commonwealth's attorney in Strickler's case, stated that he reviewed only
Exhibits two, seven, and eight and those exhibits were in his prosecution file and were disclosed to
defense counsel pursuant to the open file policy. William Bobbitt,Jr., one of Strickler's trial counsel,
stated that he had never seen any of the Stolzfus materials prior to, or during, Strickler's trial,
1998]
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Whatever the detective's reasons for not disclosing them,39 the five docu-
notwithstanding the open file policy. Similarly, Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Henderson's trial counsel,
stated in his affidavit that he had no recollection of seeing any of the Stolzfus materials in Ervin's
files. However, Thomas Roberts, Strickler's other trial counsel, stated in his affidavit that, although
he could not recall if he had seen the Stolzfus materials, he did recall the 'information contained in
them.' Roberts also stated that he had discussed with Bobbitt the 'possibility that Ms. Stolzfus may
not be a credible witness because she had not come forward immediately and her story had become
much more detailed over time.' According to Roberts, '[it seemed too good to be true.' The district
court never resolved this dispute because the district court concluded that even if Exhibits two,
seven, and eight were disclosed to Strickler, his rights under Bradj v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
were violated. Sticker, 1998 WL 340420, at *7 n. 8.
39. In regard to Detective Claytor's discriminatory forwarding policies, Ervin explained: "I
have no idea why they didn't send them to me... I don't think it was intentional. He probably
didn't think they were important." Claytor maintained he never handed over the notes to the
prosecution because they were not part of his formal investigation. Instead he claimed the notes
were letters Stolzfus wrote to him. Laura Fasbach, Prosecutor I WIon'tLetJMU Case GetAwaj: Court
Overturned 1990 Murder Conviction LastMonth, Roanoke Times & World News, November 29,1997,
at B1.
It is remarkable that the materials deemed "important," the three exhibits which were part
of the "formal investigation" turned over by Detective Claytor, were also precisely those likely to
prove useful to the prosecution: Exhibit two is a six-page, typed report of Detective's Claytor's
interviews with Stolzfus on January 19 and 22, 1990. The report contains a detailed summary of
Stolzfus' account of Whitlock's abduction. However, Detective Claytor's report notes that Stolzfus
was not sure if she could identify Strickler and Henderson, although Stolzfus indicated she might
if she saw Strickler and Henderson in person. Exhibit two also notes that Stolzfus was taken to the
police impound lot on January 24,1990, and shown the car Whitlock had been driving. According
to the report, the next day Stolzfus advised police that she now recalled the license number, NKA
243, and "had made up a code to help remember the license number after the incident, 'No Kids
After 2-43."'; Exhibit seven is a typed two-page letter dated January 26,1990, to Detective Claytor
and signed by Stolzfus. This letter contains a description of Stolzfus' encounter with Strickler,
Henderson, and the blond woman at the music store in the Valley Mall; Exhibit eight is a
three-page, typed document, undated and signed by Stolzfus. The document, entitled "Details of
Encounter with Mountain Man, Shy Guy and Blond Girl," contains a detailed description of
Whitlock's abduction and Stolzfus' encounter with Strickler, Henderson, and the blond woman in
the Valley Mall. The summary of Whitlock's abduction in this exhibit "essentially mirrors her trial
testimony and the facts set forth in the Roanoke Times article." Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at 7*-8*.
It is equally remarkable that the "unimportant" materials, the five exhibits not part of the
"formal investigation" which were not turned over to the prosecution's open file, were those which
would likely have proved most useful to defense counsel in impeaching Stolzfus' testimony. Exhibit
one is a one-page document containing Detective Claytor's hand-written notes of his initial January
19, 1990 interview with Stolzfus. The notes reveal that Stolzfus could not identify Whitlock.
Exhibit three entitled "Observations" was given to Detective Claytor by Stolzfus on January 19,
1990, at 1:00 p.m. In this exhibit, Stolzfus describes the abduction with a set of diagrams; Exhibit
four is a typed letter, dated January 22, 1990, to Detective Claytor signed by Stolzfus. In this letter,
Stolzfus explains that although she did not initially remember being at the Valley Mall on the
evening Whitlock was abducted, her memory was "jogged" when her daughter reminded her of a
small purchase at a store in the Valley Mall. In this exhibit, Stolzfus also explains that she was
uncertain about portions of the events she claimed to have witnessed the evening of Whitlock's
abduction: "I have a very vague memory that I'm not sure of. It seems as if the wild guy that I saw
had come running through the door and up to a bus as the bus was pulling off. I have impressions
of intense anger, of his going back to where the dark haired guy and girl were standing. Then the
guy I saw came running up to the black girl's window? Were those 2 memories the same person?
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ments showed that Stolzfus could not initially remember being at the mall,
identify Whitlock, Strickler, or Henderson, or remember any details of the event.
The notes and letters also showed that some of what she remembered was based
on what her 14-year-old daughter, who accompanied her mother to the mall,
recalled. For example, in a letter to police dated Jan. 22, 1990, Stolzfus said she
initially had no memory of being at the mall that Jan. 5, "[b]ut my 14-year-old
daughter Katie remembers different things and her sharing with me what she
remembers helped me Dog] my memory." 4 According to the detective's notes,
Stolzfus was unable initially to identify either Strickler or Henderson when shown
a photo lineup, despite the fact that she testified that she was "100 percent"
certain of her identification of the men.4 Instead, she said Strickler "resembled"
one of the men she had seen.42
Following the production of the Stolzfus materials pursuant to discovery,
Strickler moved for summary judgment on his Brady v. Maryland " claim." In
granting the motion, U.S. District Judge Robert Merhige Jr. wrote: "Whether
from good faith or bad, the effect is that these undisclosed materials were
suppressed by the prosecution and never disclosed" to Strickler's trial attorney.
"[Stolzfus] memory of the events to which she testified appears muddled at best
.. This information, at a minimum, would likely have been extremely valuable
in attacking her credibility with the jury, if counsel were not successful in actually
barring her testimony altogether."4 Merhige's opinion indicated that police
records, including notes, interviews, and letters from Stolzfus, "contradicted or
impeached her trial testimony in many crucial respects." '46
Upon finding that without Stolzfus' testimony, other "substantial evidence"
presented at trial "could have led a jury to believe that Henderson, rather than
Strickler, was the ring-leader in Whitlock's abduction, robbery and death," the
district court concluded Strickler's rights were violated under Brady and issued a
writ of habeas corpus. 4 The court dismissed Strickler's claim concerning the
Supreme Court of Virginia's proportionality review of his death sentence.4" The
.... " Exhibit five is an undated, typed document entitled "Notes for Detective Claytor. My
Impressions of the Car." In this exhibit, Stolzfus gives a description of the car driven by Whitlock,
but does not mention the license plate or the license plate number. Exhibit six is a hand-written
note to Detective Claytor from Stolzfus dated January 25, 1990, 1:45 am. In this note, Stolzfus
reports that she spent several hours with Whitlock's boyfriend viewing photographs and was certain
Whitlock was the black girl she saw on January 5, 1990. Stn'ckler, 1998 WL 340420, at *7-8.




43. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
44. Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at *4.
45. Campbell, supra note 39.
46. Id




Commonwealth moved for a stay of the district court's judgment, pending
appeal, which the district court granted. Both parties appealed. Before the
Fourth Circuit, Strickler claimed the district court: (1) correctly decided his Brady
claim; and (2) erred in dismissing his proportionality claim.50 In addition, he
sought Judge Luttig's recusal.5 '
II. Holdng
The Fourth Circuit determined that Strickler's Brady and proportionality
claims were procedurally defaulted, that Strickler had failed to show cause and
prejudice to excuse the default, and that the claims were, in any event, without
merit." Thus, the court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of relief.53
Judge Luttig refused to recuse himself and wrote a separate opinion on that
issue.
5 4
III. Anaysis/Application in Virginia
A. The Brady Claim
Before the Fourth Circuit concluded Strickler's Brady claim was meritless,
it first found the claim procedurally defaulted, asserting its factual basis was
available to him at the time he filed his state habeas petition under its own ruling
in Hoke v. Nether/and5 and Virginia statute.5 The court decided that "reasonably
competent [state habeas] counsel would have sought discovery in state court in
order to examine the Harrisonburg Police Department files concerning Stolzfus'
statements to Detective Claytor," and that therefore Strickler was barred from
asserting his Constitutional rights to a fair trial.5s The very existence of such a bar
is questionable. Even if the doctrine does exist, it is doubtful that its application
by the Hoke standard is constitutional.
Brady and its progeny stand for the proposition that the State has an affirma-
tive obligation under the Due Process clause to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the defendant.59 Although the United States Supreme Court has never said,
49. Id
50. Id at "1.
51. Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at *12.
52. Id at *10.
53. Id at 1.
54. Id at *12-*14.
55. 92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir 1990).
56. Stricker, 1998 WL340420,at *8 (citingHokev. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350(4th Cir 1990)).
57. Id (citing VA.CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(B)(2) (1997)). The code reads, in pertinent part:
"No writ [of habeas corpus ad subjeciendum] shall be granted on the basis of any allegation the facts
of which petitioner had know/edge at the time of filing any previous petition." VA.CODE ANN.
8.01-654(B)(2) (1997) (emphasis added).
58. Id at *8.
59. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
[Vol. 11: 1
STRICKLER V PRUETT
much less held, that this duty is affected in any way by the likelihood of the
defense finding the evidence itself,' nine courts of appeal have created a "due-
diligence" exception to the obligation.6 However, all --aside from the Fourth
Circuit-- have limited the exception to evidence the defendant actually had, or to
which he at least had easy access.62 By going further and imposing on defense
counsel a duty to affirmatively seek out information in the prosecution or police
files, the Fourth Circuit has in effect turned Brady on its head.
In Hoke v. Netherland, the Fourth Circuit found that under Virginia law, "a
petitioner is barred from raising any claim in a successive petition if the facts as
to that claim were either known or available to petitioner at the time of his
original petition."6 As applied, this formulation widened the Fourth Circuit's
"due diligence" exception previously stated in UnitedStates v. Wilson:' "where the
exculpatory information is not only available to the defendant but also lies in a
source where a reasonable defendant would have looked, a defendant is not
entitled to the benefit of the Brady doctrine."6 It is difficult to square even this
narrower rule with the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Bagkf that:
[A]n incomplete response to a specific request not only deprives the defense
of certain evidence, but also has the effect of representing to the defense that
the evidence does not exist.6'
Further, application of the exception so as to relieve the prosecution of its
Brady burden in circumstances in which the police have sole possession of the
information was explicitly rejected by Kyles v. Wlhitly.6s In Kyles the Supreme
Court held that the prosecutor remains responsible for his duty under Brady to
60. InLugop.Munox, 682 F.2d 7,9-10 (1stCir. 1982), the First Circuit erroneously concluded
the due diligence exception can be grounded in the United States Supreme Court's language in
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,111 (1976). In Agars, the Supreme Court noted that the standard
for Brady claims is different than that for claims based on newly discovered evidence because a Brady
claim concerns "evidence... available to the prosecutor and not submitted to the defense," while
a newly discovered evidence claim concerns evidence which is "found in a neutral source." 427 U.S.
at 111. In doing so, the court was simply distinguishing those cases in which Brady does apply (when
the prosecution does have the information) and when Brady does not apply (when the prosecution
does not have the information, i.e. when the defendant "found it in a neutral source").
61. See e.g. Lugo v. Munox 682 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cif. 1982); United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d
1200, 1208-09 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Perdermo, 929 F.2d 967,973 (3d Cir. 1991); Westly
v.Johnson, 83 F.3d 714,725-26 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399,405 (6th Cir.
1990); United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151,1170 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Davis, 785 F.2d
610,619 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Brown, 562 F.2d 1144,1151 (9th Cir. 1977); United States
v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923, 927-28 (11th Cit. 1988).
62. Case summary of Hoke, CAP. DEF.J., vol. 9, no. 2, p. 6 (1997).
63. Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350,1354 n. 1 (4th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted).
64. 901 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1990).
65. United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir.1990).
66. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
67. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985).
68. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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disclose favorable evidence to the defendant, regardless of whether police
investigators failed to inform the prosecutor of the existence of evidence, be-
cause the prosecutor can establish procedures and regulations to insure commu-
nication of all relevant information. 9 The Fourth Circuit quoted with approval
its own eloquent defense of this rule in Boyd v. French," decided during the very
same term in which Strickler was decided
The police are also part of the prosecution, and the taint on the trial is no less
if they, rather than the State's Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure. If
police allow the State's Attorney to produce evidence pointing to guilt with-
out informing him of other evidence in their possession which contradicts
this inference, state officers are practicing deception not only on the State's
Attorney but on the court and the defendant.7
The Fourth Circuit's application of the "due diligence" exception in Hoke,
at a minimum, came close to violating Kyles. In Hoke, where rape was the capital
murder predicate, the court held that the prosecution did not have a duty to turn
over extensive information about the victim's past sexual promiscuity because a
"reasonable" investigation by defense counsel into the factual circumstances
surrounding the murder would have revealed the same facts as were contained
in the police documents.72 Defense counsel in Hoke cut short his factual investi-
gation after his inquiry was met with "tight lips and outright hostility, including
at least one physical threat."73 However, even assuming the Hoke rule is good
law - which outside the Fourth Circuit it certainly is not - it is nevertheless
impossible, without ignoring Kyles, to square its application of Wilson to the
present circumstances. In Strickler's case, unlike Hoke's, it is absolutely clear no
amount of investigation into the factual background of the case could have
revealed the factual evidence contained in the Stolzfus materials. The key aspects
of the Stolzfus materials were Detective Claytor's personal impressions of his
first interview with Stolzfus and the fact that, as a whole, the materials demon-
strated that Stolzfus' story evolved over the course of a month from a "very
vague memory"74 to a factual pattern about which she was "100 percent" certain"h
at trial. Because Stolzfus' story had completed its transformation two months
before-hand, even had defense counsel interviewed Stolzfus on the very day on
which Strickler was indicted, defense counsel would still have heard the final
version of her story - the incriminating "detailed description"76 of events -
69. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. at 437.
70. 147 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998).
71. Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 330 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting with approval Barbee v.
Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir.1964) (footnote omitted)).
72. Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1355-56.
73. Id at 1366 (Hall, J., dissenting).
74. Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at *8.
75. Campbell, supra note 39.
76. Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at *8.
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rather than the highly suspect "impressions '77 out of which that story grew.
Moreover, it is, contrary to the Fourth Circuit's sua iponte contention,
extremely unlikely defense counsel could have obtained the Stolzfus materials (as
distinguished from the factual information contained therein) by subpoena. The
Supreme Court of Virginia rule cited by the Fourth Circuit states in relevant part:
(5) Limitations on Discovery in Certain Proceedings. In any proceeding...
(3) for a writ of habeas corpus... (a) the scope of discovery shall only extend
to matters which are relevant to the issues in the proceeding and which are
not privileged; and (b) no discovery shall be allowed in any proceeding for a
writ of habeas corpus... without prior leave of the court, which may limit
discovery in any such proceeding."
The court of appeals cited no Virginia case or authority in support of its conclu-
sion that Strickler would have, as a matter of course, been granted discovery of
the police files had he made such a motion. It seems likely the court erred in its
interpretation of this statute. In Howardv. Warden79 the Supreme Court of Virginia
noted, apparently with approval, a circuit court decision finding "police files are
privileged.""0 In addition, it is difficult to envision how Strickler might possibly
have demonstrated the "relevance" of his motion given that the Commonwealth
repeatedly insisted all required Brady disclosures had been made before trial.
But even if the defense counsel could have obtained the documents, the fact
remains that this is precisely the burden Kyies places squarely on the prosecution.
There, the court explicitly rejected the argument advanced by the State of Louisi-
ana that the burden for finding and disclosing to all parties relevant information
falls on anyone except the government:
The State of Louisiana would prefer an even more lenient rule. It pleads that
some of the favorable evidence in issue here was not disclosed even to the
prosecutor until after trial... and it suggested below that it should not be
held accountable... for evidence known only to police investigators and not
to the prosecutor. To accommodate the State in this manner would, however,
amount to a serious change of course from the Brady line of cases... Since
... the prosecutor has the means to discharge the government's Brady respon-
sibility if he will, any argument for excusing a prosecutor from disclosing
what he does not happen to know about boils down to a plea to substitute
the police for the prosecutor, and even for the courts themselves, as the final
arbiters of the government's obligation to ensure fair trials.
8
1
The Fourth Circuit applied similarly problematic reasoning in determining
Strickler's Brady claim was also procedurally defaulted under Virginia Statute.
77. Id
78. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4:1 (b)(5).
79. 348 S.E.2d 211 (Va. 1986).
80. Howard v. Warden, 348 S.E.2d 211, 212 (Va. 1986).
81. Ky/es, 514 U.S. at 438.
82. Sticker, 1998 WL 340420, at *8 (citing VA.CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(B)(2)).
1998]
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The court read the statute's prohibition on the granting of a writ of habeas
corpus ad subjeciendum "on the basis of any allegation the facts of which
petitioner bad knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition" 3 to allow it to
forbid the granting of such a writ if the "factual basis of Strickler's Brady claim
was available to him at the time he filed his state habeas petition."' As it did in
Hoke,"5 the court has literally read into the statute language the statute does not
itself contain."
B. Cause and Prejudice to Excuse Procedural Default of the Brady Claim
After concluding that Strickler's Brady claim was procedurally defaulted, the
court noted that it could only address the claim upon a finding of cause and
actual prejudice.8 7
1. Cause
Strickler asserted he had cause to excuse the default because the Brady claim
was unavailable to him at the time he filed his state habeas petition and, alterna-
tively, that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not filing a Brady
motion at trial." The court found that because it had rejected Strickler's assertion
that the factual basis for his Brady claim was unavailable to him at the time he
filed his state habeas petition, he could not establish cause based upon the
unavailability of the Brady claim.89
The Fourth Circuit likewise rejected Strickler's ineffective assistance of
counsel argument. The court found that under Strickland v. Washington ° Strick-
ler's trial counsels' action did not fall below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness because, in light of the prosecutor's open file policy, trial counsel were under
no obligation to file a Brady motion." This result demonstrates how important
it is for counsel to file particularized, time-limited, pre-trial Kyes motions and the
danger of relying on a prosecutor's open-file policy.
Further, in a jurisdiction in which a Commonwealth Attorney maintains an
open file policy, there is no reason defense counsel should be denied access to
it simply because Kyles motions must also be filed and litigated. Strickleris proof
83. VA.CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(B)(2) (emphasis added).
84. Id at *8.
85. Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1354.
86. Strickkr, 1998 WL 340420, at *8.
87. Id
88. Id at *9.
89. Strckler, 1998 WL 340420, at *9 (quoting Stockton v. Murray, 41 F.3d 920, 925 (4th
Cir.1994) (holding "[e]ven if [the petitioner] had not actually raised or known of the claims
previously, he still cannot establish cause to excuse his default if he should have known of such
claims through the exercise of reasonable diligence.")).
90. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
91. Strickler, 1998 WL 340420, at *9.
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positive that there is no guarantee that the "open file" will contain all the infor-
mation covered by the prosecutor's obligation to disclose. Commonwealth
Attorneys adopting an "either the file or the motions fight" stance may thereby
establish governmental interference with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
They may also violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause by
purposefully and arbitrarily establishing two classes of defendants - those who
forgo the right to file motions and those who do not.
2. Prejudice
To establish "actual prejudice," Strickler was required to demonstrate "not
merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they
worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with
error of constitutional dimensions."92 The court concluded that the Stolzfus
materials would have provided little or no help to Strickler in either phase of the
trial, and as such found no error.93
The court reasoned that because Strickler never contested that he abducted
and robbed Whitlock, but instead argued he should only be convicted of first
degree murder because Henderson actually killed Whitlock, the Stolzfus' testi-
mony was not critical to the Commonwealth's case.94 The court likewise con-
cluded that the Stolzfus' testimony would have been of no import during the
sentencing phase of the trial because the parties focused their arguments on
Strickler's prior criminal record and the way in which Whitlock was killed.9" As
such, it found that failure to disclose any or all of the Stolzfus materials did not
undermine its "confidence in the outcome of the trial," and that Strickler had
therefore failed to establish prejudice.96
The court's reasoning is flawed. Had defense counsel been made aware of
the fact that it had materials which, according to the District Court, "contradicted
or impeached [Stolzfus'] trial testimony in many crucial respects" and "would
likely have been extremely valuable in attacking her credibility with the jury" or,might "actually [bar] her testimony altogether"' they might well have pursued an
entirely different defense strategy. Had they done so, the outcome of the trial
might well have been different. At the very least, the issue of relative involvement
of co-defendants is important to the life/death sentencing issue, and Stolzfus'
testimony clearly painted Strickler as the ringleader from the outset.
The United States Supreme Court has a number of options in Strickler. The
court could conclude that: (1) there is no due-diligence exception, that the
92. Id (citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); Satcher v. Pruett, 126 F.3d
561, 572 (4th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 595 (1997)).
93. Id at *10.
94. Id
95. Strckler, 1998 WL 340420, at *10.
96. Id (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)).
97. Campbell, supra note 39.
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evidence was material to Strickler's guilt or innocence, and as such he is entitled
to a new trial; (2) there is no due-diligence exception, that the Supreme Court will
not decide materiality, but remand on that question; (3) there is a due diligence
exception but its extreme application by the Fourth Circuit is unconstitutional;
or (4) the Fourth Circuit was correct. Defense counsel should follow carefully the
outcome in Strickler, for it is potentially very significant. No matter what the high
court rules, the state of the law can not be worse in the Fourth Circuit, and it
might get much better.
Attorneys should recognize that this case further demonstrates the necessity
of always filing Kyks pre-trial motions despite a prosecutor's open file policy.
These motions should have the following three elements: (1) detailed and specific
requests for information; (2) time limits on compliance by the prosecution; (3)
case law which finds that the information being requested is within the scope of
Kyles. Research into what types of materials have been found to be within the
scope of Ky/es should provide defense counsel a large foundation on which to
base such motions.98
C. The Prvportionahiy Claim
Strickler presented his proportionality claim for the first time in his state
habeas petition where it was found to be procedurally defaulted under the
authority of Slayton v. Parigan.9 The district court likewise held that Strickler's
proportionality review claim was procedurally defaulted under Slayton and that
Strickler failed to establish cause and actual prejudice to excuse the default.I"n
98. Examples of materials found to be within scope of Kyles:
a. Competency hearing report from trial of a prosecution witness in an earlier unrelated
matter. East v. Johnson, 123 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 1997).
b. Fact that jailhouse snitch has a history as an informant in other cases. Pyles v. Johnson,
136 F.3d 986 (5th Cir. 1998).
c. Presentence reports for witnesses who have federal convictions. Note that if state
prosecutor is not charged with the obligation to disclose, the court itself may have a quasi-Brad
duty to furnish them. U.S. v. Beckford, 962 F.Supp. 780 (E.D. Va 1997)(Beckford I)
d. Evidence of victim's criminal activity, like drug dealing, at time of his or her death. U.S.
v. Beckford, 962 F. Supp. 804 (ED. Va. 1997)(Beckford II).
e. Investigation documents created by law enforcement officers. United States v. Tolliver,
61 F.3d 1189 (5th Cir. 1995).
f. Promise not to oppose co-defendant's witness' parole; allowing co-defendant's witness
unsupervised visits from his girl-friend; police report indicating a person had seen someone other
than defendant threaten victim over drug debts. Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989 (5th Cir. 1996)
g. Oral statements of witnesses to police, not recorded by police, when they took written
statements. Guerra v. Johnson, 90 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996).
h. Police reports of interviews with victim witnesses, containing information that would
have alerted defendants to defensively significant matters; "Lead Sheets" prepared by police after
a composite picture of the suspect was broadcast in news media. Fogarty v. State, 497 S.E.2d 628
(Ga. App. 1998).
99. 215 Va. 27,205 S.E.2d 680 (1974) (holding that claims that could have been raised at trial
or on direct appeal but wiere not cannot be considered on collateral review).
100. Strckler, 1998 WL 340420, at * 11..
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Therefore the question again before the Fourth Circuit was whether Strickler had
cause and actual prejudice to excuse the default.'0 '
Strickler contended he established cause because he was unable to raise his
proportionality claim until after the Supreme Court of Virginia conducted a
proportionality review and affirmed his sentence on direct appeal.'0 2 The Fourth
Circuit rejected this argument on the ground that Strickler failed to employ two
rarely used procedural devices. First, it found that because one of the issues
before the Supreme Court of Virginia on direct appeal was whether Strickler's
death sentence was "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in
similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant," Stickler had the
opportunity to raise a facial challenge to all proportionality review in Virginia.0 3
Second, the court found that Strickler could have made an as-applied challenge
to the proportionality review he received on direct appeal in a rehearing petition
to the Supreme Court of Virginia."°4 Because the court found Strickler had failed
to show cause, it concluded he had not excused the procedural default.
10 5
The court's opinion indicates that it is no longer premature to file a pre-trial
facial challenge to Virginia's proportionality review of death sentences. Defense
counsel should cite this case in support of such motions. Moreover, the court has
now held, implicitly if not explicitly, that failure to invoke an optional procedural
device, the petition for rehearing, may bar defendants on appeal from challenging
deficient review in their case. Defense counsel should cite this case in support of
petitions for rehearing, or in support of any other motion in which an extraordi-
nary remedy is requested.
D. Strickler's Request for Judge LJttig's Recusal
Strickler filed a motion requesting CircuitJudge Luttig be disqualified from
participation in the decision of his case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455.106 As
grounds for disqualification, Strickler cited the "unavoidable parallels" between
the murder of Luttig's father and that of Leanne Whitlock."°7
101. Id
102. Id
103. Id at *12.
104. Strickr, 1998 WL 340420, at *12.
105. Id
106. The statute, in pertinent part, reads as follows: "Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably
be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455.
107. Luttig recounted the circumstances of his father's death as follows: "My dad was
murdered in the driveway of his home in Tyler, Texas, during a carjacking, at approximately 11:00
p.m. on April 19, 1994--more than four years ago now. Upon exiting his vehicle in the garage, my
dad was confronted by three armed, black youths, and shot twice in the head with a .45 caliber
weapon. A single shot was fired at my mother, but she was not struck. The three perpetrators left
my parents' home immediately. No personal items, other than the car, were stolen from my dad or
my mother. Nothing was stolen from the interior compartments of my parents' car. At trial, it was
shown that the three youths who murdered my dad had contemplated, and actually attempted, other
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Section 455(a) requires a judge to recuse himself in any circumstance in
which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."' This is an objective
standard."° Luttig declined to recuse himself on the grounds that, in his judge-
ment, the factual and legal issues presented in Strickler's appeal were so different
than those concerning his father's death that no one, except those who believe
his father's death ought to disqualify him from deciding any murder case, could
reasonably question his ability to impartially decide Strickler's case.
Despite Luttig's public statements regarding the emotional torment his
father's violent death caused him and his support for imposing the death penalty
on the perpetrators,1 0 Luttig claimed that the "the natural inference arises that
carjackings in the immediately preceding days and that they had, on the night of the murder,
followed my mother and dad to their home, having the purpose and intent of stealing my parents'
vehicle. Although the three who murdered my dad were black, there was no testimony presented
of either racial motivation or racial animus. Two of the three youths were convicted in federal court
on carjacking charges and in state court on murder charges. The third was convicted of capital
murder in state court." Strick/er, 1998 WL 340420, at *12.
108. Id at 12. In addition to this broad objective standard, the statute, in §455(b), also speci-
fies five circumstances in which the judge must recuse himself:
b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or
a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a
lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness
concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or
expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child
residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy
or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either
of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party;
(i) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially
affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceed-
ing.
109. John M. DelPrete, Not Holding the Balance Nice Clear and True.- The Right to An Impartial
Judge, CAP. DEF. DIG., vol. 7, no. 2, p. 16 (1995).
110. Judge Luttig spoke openly about his feelings to the press. ... J. Michael Luttig, was
quoted in the Tyler Courier-Times-Telegraph two days later: "I think it is a tragedy when anyone
has to receive a sentence of death from the state, but on the other hand, individuals must be held
accountable at some point for actions such as this... I thought it was a proper case for the death
penalty." Beazley, the triggerman, was the only one sentenced to death. Luttig testified at Beazley's
trial. "We lived in absolute terror as a family. It is indescribable what this family went through the
six weeks before this case was broken ... There's not a human being who should ever, ever have
to experience that... My dad was my hero. He still is my hero. I worshiped the ground he walked
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the present disqualification motion has been filed not because my dad was the
victim of a murder, but, rather, because I am the author of three, and I joined a
fourth, of this Circuit's authorities which Strickler's counsel could have reason-
ably surmised might bear upon the disposition of the appeals sub judice.... As
such, Luttig declined to recuse himself. Although future attempts to disqualify
Luttig will likely fail, particularly in light of the fact that only the United States
Supreme Court can review his decision, defense counsel should continue to
request his recusal because adjudication by a biased judge is not subject to
harmless error review." 2 Furthermore, because the "might reasonably be ques-
tioned" standard is an objective one, each time defense counsel requests disquali-
fication is further evidence that Luttig's impartiality is in fact questioned.
Douglas R. Banghart
on. I still do." Fasbach, supra note 38.
111. Stricker, 1998 WL 340420, at *12. According to Luttig, the cases in which he participated
are: Barnes v. Thompson, 58 F.3d 971 (4th Cir.1995) (Luttig,J.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 4351 (1995);
Hoke v. Netherland, 92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir.) (Luttig,J.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 630 (1996); In re
Netherland, No. 97-8 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 1997) (Luttig,J.) (staying district court's ex parte grant of
pre-petition discovery to state prisoner); In re Pruett, 133 F.3d 275 (4th Cir.1997) (Hall,J., joined
by Luttig and Motz, JJ.).
112. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 n.8 (1967).
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